Route customers you cannot underwrite at signature into their own contract type and their own revenue line, so churn from unproven accounts never contaminates the retention number your valuation rests on.
Maintained in the open at github.com/Golden-Section-Tx/playbook · CC BY-SA 4.0
A professional services firm wanted it badly. Their chief executive had been asked by his largest customer why nothing anywhere tracked the twenty-some projects the two companies were running together, and he came back from that lunch wanting a system. The vendor moved heaven and earth to stand it up before the new year. The first task was simple. Every account owner picks five customers and writes a plan. Nobody did it, and nobody made them, and two years later the logo churned.
The churn was not the damage. And some churn is the honest price of a market still forming. The damage was that one blended retention number went to the board and the bank and eventually to an acquirer, and each of them priced the whole book to the weakest cohort inside it.
You cannot underwrite every customer at signature. Even the best qualification processes miss or, worse yet, reject what would have been a great long term customer. Two prospects present the same way, and one has an organization that will do the work while the other has a champion pushing a noodle uphill against a parent company that was never going to allow it. Sometimes the party who decides is not at the customer at all. An overseas owner, or a head office, or an acquirer who arrives in year two. You will not know for twelve to twenty-four months.
But that is an argument for changing your accounting, not for turning the customer away. Take him. Keep him out of the core revenue line until he earns his way in.
The goal: Report three numbers. What the core book retains, what the provisional book is worth, and how often provisional becomes core.
This only works if three things move together. Label the account without changing the paper and the accounting and you have relabeled a risk, nothing more.
Founders skip the third and it carries all the weight at exit. A revenue line built at inception is evidence of discipline. The same line created six months before a process is evidence of nothing.
My sales lead is routing every hard conversation into the provisional bucket. Your qualification discipline has moved into the accounting instead of the sales process. Cap provisional as a share of new logos and review each routing decision at the board.
Nobody has been promoted in two cycles. The bucket is working correctly and your ideal customer profile is wrong. Go back to Customer Segmentation.
My customer found out he is in a bucket. You named it badly. This is an internal designation and there is no version of that conversation that helps him.
Review the three numbers every quarter with your board — core net retention, provisional book size, and provisional-to-core conversion rate. Demote where the evidence has gone the other way. Conversion rate is the number that tells you whether your qualification is improving.
You cannot underwrite every customer at signature. Even the best qualification processes miss or, worse yet, reject what would have been a great long term customer. Two prospects present the same way, and one has an organization that will do the work while the other has a champion pushing a noodle uphill against a parent company that was never going to allow it.
Route customers you cannot underwrite at signature into their own contract type and their own revenue line, so churn from unproven accounts never contaminates the retention number your valuation rests on.