Golden Section publishes its research in full — the thesis, the evidence behind it, and the corrections when the evidence goes the other way. Everything the firm has published is listed here.
One argument, built and then tested in public: what the 2026 software selloff was actually pricing, the thesis that answered it, and the earnings season that put the thesis on the record.
The most severe SaaS selloff since COVID: IGV down 30% from its September 2025 peak, $830B of market capitalisation erased in six sessions. Our finding is that AI fear accounts for 60–70% of the severity, but that it gave the market permission to re-rate what the numbers had been saying for three years. The damage is overwhelmingly horizontal; vertical SaaS with a domain moat is structurally insulated.
The full account of how AI went from existential threat to strategic partner: the inciting event, the bear case, the ZIRP distortion the market ignored, and the doctrine that ended the panic — that AI enhances software with a domain moat and hollows out software without one. It is also one of the firm's named frameworks.
The earnings test of the doctrine. Forty-three public software companies reported into an identical macro and got outcomes sixty points apart — Atlassian up 35%, IBM down 25% — decided not by growth but by whether AI arrives in your product or in your customer's capex line. Written for both a limited partner and a founder.
Three papers written in 2020 and 2021, re-run claim by claim against the data available six years later. We publish the corrections rather than quietly reprinting: an investor who acted on the original deserves to know which parts survived.
Every load-bearing claim in the 2020 paper against 2026 data. Five of six conclusions hold: a 10x revenue multiple and a 45–50% cash-flow margin are both still defensible, on conditions the original left unstated. Two inputs moved far enough to change what a rational investor should pay — the discount rate and the exit multiple.
Eleven propositions from the 2020 defence of venture capital, scored against September 2026 data. The centrepiece exhibit inverted, the reassuring bottom-quartile floor gave way, and every measure the original relied on was a mark rather than cash. The case for venture in general has weakened; the case for a particular kind of venture is sharper.
The 2021 instinct holds — the fee rate in isolation is still not where the money is — but the paper measured that fee against a ten-year fund that returned capital, and neither condition is true any more. Venture is the only major strategy whose fee did not move, and “fees are returned first” turns out to be a priority of payment rather than a payment. Golden Section charges management fees; every conclusion adverse to managers is adverse to us.
The arguments above are the reason the frameworks exist and the reason the portfolio is built the way it is. If you want the applied version rather than the evidence, start with the named frameworks or the operational corpus.